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Blockchain Consensus Formation while Solving
Optimization Problems
Naoki Shibata
Abstract—This paper proposes a new decentralized consensus
protocol for a blockchain.
Index Terms—Cryptographic protocols, peer-to-peer comput-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of Bitcoin[1], there have been many
cryptocurrencies built on distributed public ledgers called
blockchains. A blockchain is a growing list of blocks of data
items, which is designed to be resistant to modification of the
data. In a cryptocurrency, each transaction is registered as an
item in a block. Bitcoin uses a Proof-of-work(PoW) system to
decide which is the correct outcome of the latest transactions,
and prevent double-spending of the coins. In a PoW system,
the participating nodes are asked to do some computational
task to make a majority decision on a one-CPU-one-vote basis.
While PoW works very robustly against misbehaving and
malicious participants on the network where impersonation
is easy, the huge amount of electricity expended for PoW
is becoming a problem. The estimated energy consumed by
Bitcoin is at least 2.55 gigawatts in 2018, which is comparable
to the electricity consumed in countries such as Ireland (3.1
gigawatts)[2].
In order to address this problem of huge wasted energy,
various alternatives to PoW and distributed public ledgers
based on different working principles have been proposed.
Although many of the alternative methods exhibits better
energy efficiency, some of these methods introduce a single
point of failure or they have to trust an external party. The
main advantage of PoW is that it does not need to trust
anything except that it requires a majority of CPU power
to be controlled by honest nodes. There are only a few
alternative methods that satisfy this condition. Bitcoin and
cryptocurrencies based on PoW are still predominant because
of unparalleled security and robustness.
In this paper, we propose a consensus protocol for
blockchains, named Proof-of-search(PoS), in which the com-
putation for making a consensus can be used to search for a
good approximate solution of an instance of any optimization
problem. Any user, called a client, can implement and submit a
program called an evaluator that evaluates a solution candidate
of a problem to be solved. In our protocol, a concatenation
of a solution candidate and its evaluation value is used as
a nonce, instead of an integer. In order to generate a valid
nonce, a node has to execute the evaluator to evaluate some
solution candidate. Since a large number of nonces have to
be generated in the consensus process, a large number of
solution candidates have to be evaluated. Our protocol also
allows a client to provide a search program that implements
any randomized search algorithm that finds a good solution by
evaluating a large number of solution candidates. Our protocol
has built-in functionalities for submitting problem instances
and receiving the results. Effectively, a block chain with PoS
can be used as a batch processing system. Clients can just
submit a job without mining, and miners are not required to
submit any job. If no job is submitted to the system, the system
automatically adds an empty job that is equivalent to PoW. The
nodes that succeeded in adding a new block and finding the
best solution are rewarded in two different ways. The former
node is rewarded in the same way as PoW. The latter node is
rewarded only by the client. In this way, collusion between a
client and a miner can be prevented.
Our protocol makes nodes search for good approximate
solutions of multiple problems in parallel. This has secondary
effect of lowering the probability of a fork and the variance
of a block time. We show our results of analysis indicating
that the probability of a fork and the variance of block time
are lower with our protocol than with the PoW system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces related work. Section III explains our consensus
protocol. In Section IV, we discuss properties of our protocol.
In Section V, the conclusions are presented.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Bitcoin and Proof-of-Work
Bitcoin[1] is a robust, secure and decentralized cryptocur-
rency. It is built on a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server
to generate computational proof of the chronological order of
transactions. This proof is provided by a PoW system. The idea
of PoW was first proposed as a way to deter SPAM e-mails[3],
[4]. In Bitcoin, PoW is used in majority decision making on
a one-CPU-one-vote basis on peer-to-peer networks where a
user can allocate many IP addresses and one-IP-address-one-
vote does not work.
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Fig. 1: Distributed timestamp server in Bitcoin[1]
The distributed timestamp server in Bitcoin works by form-
ing a linked list of blocks of data items to be timestamped(Fig.
1). Each block contains the hash value of last block and data
items. Each time a new block is added to the chain, a hash
value of the new block is computed and widely published. The
PoW in Bitcoin involves finding a value whose hash value
begins with a required number of zero bits. Each block has an
entry for integer value called a nonce, and only a block that
have a nonce that makes the block’s hash value begin with
the required number of zero bits is accepted as a valid block.
An incentive is provided to nodes to support the network by
giving a new coin to the node that succeed in adding a new
block. Network nodes that try to add a block are called miners.
Honest miners try to add a new block to the longest chain.
As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest
miners, the honest chain will grow the fastest, and in this way
a majority decision is made. The time for a block to be added
is called a block time. The required number of zero bits is
automatically adjusted in order to make the expected block
time 10 minutes.
Bitcoin is not a mere online payment system, but it aims
at substituting a currency. For this purpose, the system has
to be extremely robust. It does not depend on any party or
computing node. The entity of Bitcoin is the data in the
network. It will never vanish into nothing as long as there
are enough honest nodes. Bitcoin has properties listed below.
• Decentralized and self-regulated
• No need to trust any node or any party
• Hard to modify the data in blocks
• Immune to Sybil attacks
• The winning probability for each miner is proportional
to its computation power
• Legitimacy of blocks can be quickly verified anytime by
any node
• Any node can join anytime without pre-registration
However, Bitcoin requires miners to use their computation
resources for PoW, which is basically repeated calculation
of hash values. This is waste of computation resources and
electricity.
B. Alternatives to Proof-of-Work
To address the wasted computation resources and en-
ergy by Bitcoin, various alternative consensus protocols for
blockchains have been proposed.
Proof-of-space[5] is a protocol between a prover and a
verifier where the prover is supposed to store some large
amount of data. A verifier asks a prover to send a piece of
data in order to check if it still stores its data. The protocol
is designed to make the computation, storage requirement and
communication complexity of the verifier small. In order to
use Proof-of-space in a decentralized blockchain, a way of
determining the winning node and a way for each miner to
know how likely it will win are required. The probability
of winning should be proportional to the space allocated by
each node. These practical considerations are discussed in
[6]. As mentioned in the paper, Proof-of-space has its own
weaknesses. One of the problems is that nodes can mine on
multiple chains simultaneously. Miners can also try creating
many different blocks with a single proof-of-space by altering
the block contents slightly, and announce the most favorable
one.
In Permacoin[7], mining resources are used for distributed
storage of archival data. Successfully minting money requires
random access to a local copy of a file. To mine coins,
a miner needs to prove that the archive file is intact with
a Proof-of-retrievability, which is an interactive protocol for
cryptographically proving the retrievability of data.
In Proof-of-useful-work[8] and Primecoin[9], the compu-
tation for making a consensus is used for more meaningful
purposes than calculation of hash values. The former enables
the computation to be used for solving Orthogonal Vectors
problems, while the latter makes a consensus by searching for
chains of prime numbers. However, it is not clear how much
public demand there is to find solutions of such problems.
Proof-of-stake, which is first implemented in Peercoin[10],
is a consensus protocol that chooses the creator of the next
block based on combinations of random selection and wealth
or age. With this protocol, the one who has more coins will
create blocks more often, and thus more coins are granted. In
this protocol, the designated creator of the next block has to
be trusted. Richest nodes are more likely to be selected, and
thus they have control of the network.
Proof-of-activity[11] is a combination of PoW and Proof-of-
stake. In this scheme, miners work on PoW to add an empty
block header. In this header, a random group of validators
are designated in the same way as in Proof-of-stake. These
validators are asked to sign the new block. If the new block
is signed by all the chosen validators, it is added to the chain.
The advantage of Proof-of-activity is that it requires both a
majority of CPU power and a majority of coins to take control
of the cryptocurrency.
Proof-of-burn[12], is a consensus protocol that gives a right
to vote to a node if it sends its coin to a special address where
the coin cannot be redeemed. Obviously, nodes that have rights
to vote have to be trusted in this scheme. There is another
interesting use of Proof-of-burn, which is to move coins from
a cryptocurrency to another cryptocurrency. In order to do this,
the coins are sent to the address specific to the destination
cryptocurrency, where the coins cannot be redeemed with the
original cryptocurrency. Then, a new transaction is added to
the destination cryptocurrency indicating that the user received
the equivalent amount of coins, referring to the transaction in
the original cryptocurrency.
Gridcoin[13] implements a Proof-of-research scheme,
which rewards miners who perform computations on
the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing
(BOINC)[14]. Although the computation for consensus proto-
col is used for scientific computations and thus the energy is
used for very meaningful purposes, the cryptocurrency system
has to depend on the BOINC system.
Proof-of-luck[15] and Proof-of-elapsed-time[16] utilize a
trusted execution environment(TEE) to form a consensus.
A TEE is special hardware that executes software securely
with respect to confidentiality and integrity. With this kind
of hardware, user’s interference to the consensus process can
be avoided, and thus a consensus protocol can be realized
relatively easily. However, only software signed by a trusted
party can be executed on a TEE.
Tendermint[17] is a consensus protocol for blockchains
without mining. In this protocol, a Byzantine fault tolerance
algorithm is utilized to form a consensus among a known
set of participants, and it is resilient up to 1/3 of Byzantine
participants. This protocol uses a Proof-of-stake approach in
order to prevent Sybil attacks.
Nano[18] utilizes distributed acyclic graphs(DAG) to store
transactions. In a DAG, transactions are stored in nodes, where
each node corresponds to a single transaction. A conflict is
resolved by a majority vote among representatives chosen
by the participants. Each vote has a weight calculated as
the sum of all balances of the participants who chose this
representative.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We propose a new consensus protocol for blockchains,
called Proof-of-search(PoS), which have all the advantages of
Proof-of-work explained in II-A. PoS allows the computation
power wasted in Proof-of-work to be used for searching for an
approximate solution of an instance of optimization problem.
It allows any node to submit a problem instance to be solved.
In this paper, a solution means an approximate solution.
To solve a problem is to find an approximate solution of the
problem.
A. Key idea
We first introduce the concept of an evaluator, a searcher,
a client and a job. An evaluator is a computer program that
deterministically computes the evaluation value of a given
solution candidate of an instance of an optimization problem.
An evaluator has to always output the same value if the same
input is given, regardless of the platform it is running on. An
evaluator includes an instance of a problem. A job is data
that represent an execution request of a search for a solution
of an optimization problem. A job includes an evaluator and
all necessary information regarding to the search request. Any
node can submit a job to the system, and the node submitted
a job is called a client. A job can be submitted to the system
by registering the job on the blockchain. The ID of the client
is also included in a job. For example, a client can implement
an evaluator to evaluate a solution candidate of an instance of
the traveling salesman problem(TSP). In this case, an order of
visiting cities is an input of for the evaluator, and it outputs
the total length of the tour.
In PoS, a concatenation of a solution candidate and its
evaluation value is used as a nonce. The system chooses an
evaluator from submitted jobs, and specifies which evaluator is
used to generate a valid nonce to add the next block. In order
to add a new block, a mining node has to find a nonce that
makes the block’s hash value begin with a required number
of zero bits, in the same way as in PoW. Unlike PoW, not
every nonce is valid. In order to generate a valid nonce, a
node executes the specified evaluator to evaluate some solution
candidate. A valid nonce has to contain a solution candidate
and its evaluation value. Since miners have to generate a large
number of hash values to add a new block, we can enforce
miners to evaluate a large number of solution candidates. By
showing a valid nonce that makes the block’s hash value begin
with a required number of zero bits, the system provides a
probabilistic proof that the miners have carried out evaluations
of a large number of solution candidates. Verification of a hash
value is to execute the evaluator with the solution candidate
in the nonce and confirm that the resulting evaluation value
matches the one included in the nonce. Then, the hash value
of the block is checked if it begins with the specified number
of zero bits. In order to make verification quick, evaluation
has to be quick.
There are two objectives of evaluation. One is to find a
nonce that begins with a required number of zero bits. Another
objective is to find a good solution with a good evaluation. In
PoS, it is assumed that a large number of solution candidates
have to be evaluated in order to find a good solution. A
node that succeeds in finding the best solution among all
nodes will be rewarded by the client. In order to make this
search efficient, a client provides a computer program called
a searcher that implements a randomized search algorithm
like a genetic algorithm. A searcher is included in a job,
and executed by miners. It internally calls the evaluator many
times. Each time an evaluation is made inside the searcher, it
automatically calculates the hash value of the block to check
if it begins with a required number of zero bits, and broadcast
it if it does. The search continues until a new block is added.
In PoW, there is no need to prepare for a reuse of the results
of computation in the past. This is because the only way to
obtain a hash value is to compute the hash function, and the ID
of miner and the last block are associated with the hash value.
In PoS, we need to guarantee that an evaluation is made each
time a block’s hash value is generated. Because the amount of
computation in an evaluation can be substantially larger than
that for calculating a hash value, miners would try to reuse
the results of evaluations by sharing them among different
nodes. In order to prevent this, we have to associate each
result of evaluation to the ID of miner and other stuff. In
order for this, we make an evaluator take the hash value of
all the items in a block except the nonce itself, as the second
argument. A tiny amount of error is introduced to the output
of an evaluator in order to make the output depend on the
second argument. This algorithm of introducing error has to
be devised and implemented differently by each client. This is
like using an evaluator as a substitute of a hash function, but
such a property is not strictly required for an evaluator. If an
evaluator is executed twice with the same solution candidate
given for the first argument, and different values for the second
argument, then it should be infrequent that the same value is
returned, but this is not strictly prohibited. This will be further
discussed in IV-A.
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Fig. 2: Distributed timestamp server in a minimal PoS scheme
The data structure of blockchain with a minimal PoS scheme
is shown in Fig. 2. This minimal scheme works with a single
fixed evaluator, and it does not have a functionality to search
for a good solution. A blockchain with this scheme works
in a similar way as a blockchain with PoW. We are going
to enhance this minimal scheme to add functionalities for
submission of jobs, payment and execution of multiple jobs.
B. Placing a job request
We want the following three properties in PoS.
• A miner has a financial incentive to find and provide a
good solution.
• A node is not incentivized to submit a problem instance
for which it already knows a good solution.
• Submitting a problem instance that is not worth solving
is financially discouraged.
Especially, we need to prepare for the case where a client
knows a good solution for its job. Possible motivation for
submitting such a job is listed below.
1) It is advantageous in adding a block.
2) It is rewarded by minted coin.
3) The node can make a profit by finding a good solution.
We need to give honest miners a financial incentive to find a
good solution, while preventing malicious miners from making
a profit. In PoS, this is realized by making a client pay the
charge for its job. Finding the solution with the best evaluation
is only rewarded by this charge, and in this way, PoS has all
the properties listed above. For item 1, knowing or finding
a good solution is not advantageous in adding a block, as
explained in III-A. For item 2, finding a good solution is not
rewarded by minted coins. For item 3, a client cannot make
a profit by finding a good solution with the job it submitted.
Since a client has to pay the charge for its job, it only submits
a problem instance that is worth paying the charge.
We want to make the payment process fully automated
without trusting any node. In order to ensure the charge to
be paid, it is collected before execution of a job. A client
first submits a job including the charge. Then, the system
automatically deducts the charge before execution of the job,
and pays it to the winner after completion of the job.
The found solution has to be sent to the client. If a node
simply broadcasts its solution to the network, this solution can
be stolen by another node. If a node encrypts the solution with
the public key of the client, the corresponding private key has
to be published afterward, and the client has to be trusted to
do that. In order to make sure that the node that found the
best solution is paid automatically without having the solution
stolen by other nodes or trusting any node, each node first
registers the evaluation value of the found solution and the
hash value of a concatenation of its ID and the solution on the
blockchain. Then, in the next block time, each node checks if
its solution is the best. The winning node registers its solution
on the blockchain, and then the charge is paid to the winning
node after confirming that the solution is genuine.
C. Simultaneous execution of multiple jobs
In order to make the charge reasonable, we make miners
execute multiple jobs at a time. We also want to make the
winning probability of each node proportional to the compu-
tation power spent for the job. In order for this, we add mini-
blocks between blocks, where each mini-block corresponds to
a job. A mini-block consists of only a nonce, the ID of mining
node, and the hash value of the last block, as shown in Fig. 3.
Miners try to find a valid nonce of any mini-block that makes
the mini-block’s hash value begin with the required number
of zero bits. As explained in III-A, a valid nonce contains a
solution candidate of the corresponding job and its evaluation
value. Each time such a nonce is found, the node adds the
corresponding mini-block by broadcasting the mini-block with
that nonce. A block is added when all the mini-blocks are
added for all the jobs specified by the system. New coins are
rewarded to all the nodes that add the mini-blocks. Verification
of hash values is to repeat the process explained in III-A for
each mini-block.
Because of message delivery delay in a network, there
could be a difference in the sets of messages received by two
different nodes. Consequently, two mining nodes may have
different sets of items to be included in a new block. Thus,
two different nodes may be executing the jobs to add different
blocks. In other words, these nodes are executing their jobs
to add mini-blocks that contain the hash values of different
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Fig. 3: Distributed timestamp server in the proposed method
blocks. In order to prevent a mini-fork and make a larger
number of nodes work to add the same block, we make miners
execute jobs on the longest chain whenever possible. Here, one
chain is longer than another if it has more blocks. If two chains
have the same number of blocks, the chain with more mini-
blocks after the last block is longer. When a node receives a
new mini-block added by another node, it checks if the chain
associated with the new mini-block is longer. If this chain is
valid and longer, the node immediately starts executing jobs
on it. When a node adds a new mini-block, it also broadcasts
the corresponding block and all the added mini-blocks that
come after the block.
We make the expected amount of computation for each job
proportional to the charge. It is fairly straightforward to realize
this by making the system adjust the required numbers of
zero bits in the hash values according to the charge. We now
assume that the same amount of computation is required in an
evaluation for each job. The system knows the average total
charge C of incoming job requests per block time, by scanning
the requests placed in the past. The system also knows the
average number E of evaluations made by all miners per block
time, by checking the block times and the numbers of zero bits
of the past mini-blocks. Let cj denote the charge for job j.
The system should choose the combination of jobs to satisfy∑
j cj ≈ C. Then, the number zj of zero bits for job j should
be set to satisfy 2zj ≈ cj ·E/C.
D. Execution environment
In order to implement PoS, an execution environment is
needed for evaluators and searchers. In order to make the
amount of computation for each job proportional to the charge,
we need to compensate for the difference in the amount
of computation of evaluation for each job. For example, if
the evaluator for job j1 takes two times of execution time
compared to the evaluator for job j2, then 1 more zero
bits should be required in the hash value with j2. Since
execution of evaluator has to be deterministic, we need a
platform-independent way of counting the number of steps.
The number of steps can be, for example, the number of
bytecode instructions executed on a virtual machine. The
execution environment has to have a functionality to count
the number of steps in execution of an evaluator. The required
number of zero bits for each mini-block has to be adjusted
according to the measured number of steps in execution.
Since any user can submit a job, an evaluator can be
inappropriately implemented. In case evaluator takes too many
steps for execution, there must be a way to terminate this
execution after a specified number of steps. In order to make
execution of evaluator deterministic, this step count has to be
exact. If an evaluator crashes or is terminated, it is regarded
as returning the worst evaluation.
It is possible that a searcher takes too much computation
compared to the evaluator. This can be easily detected by
checking the number of steps. In this case, a miner is allowed
to switch the search algorithm to a simple random search. By
doing this, the node can increase its hash rate while it would
be less likely to find the best solution.
In summary, the execution environment has to satisfy the
following conditions.
• It allows safe execution of untrusted code.
• It provides a way to guarantee that an evaluator runs
deterministically.
• It counts the number of steps of execution in a platform-
independent way.
• It returns the number of steps after execution.
• It terminates execution after a specified number of steps.
Implementing an interpreter-based virtual machine for the
execution environment satisfying all the above conditions
should be straightforward. Execution can be made deter-
ministic by not providing APIs that make execution non-
deterministic.
E. Compacting blockchain
With the method explained above, all the evaluators
recorded in a blockchain have to be executed in order to
verify a chain. However, the size of an evaluator would be
significantly larger than a hash value, and the storage space
for keeping all the evaluators can become a heavy burden
in managing a blockchain. The required storage size can be
reduced by relaxing the requirements in verification of a chain.
If the participants think it is sufficient to verify a certain
number of blocks, then the information regarding to the jobs
recorded in the older blocks can be discarded. In Fig. 3,
only the hash value above the dotted line is checked during
verification of old blocks, and therefore the information below
the dotted line can be discarded for old blocks. Even with
this relaxed way of verification, it is very hard to modify the
items in the old blocks without redoing all the PoS for the
new blocks.
F. Putting them all together
Our protocol is an enhancement of PoW, and thus it uses
techniques common with PoW. A blockchain with our protocol
is structured as a peer-to-peer network. The entire network
is loosely connected without a fixed topology. In order for
a node to join a network, it has to know one of the nodes
that is already a part of the network. Each node connects to
several random nodes. A message is broadcast with a gossip
protocol. Each node retains a copy of the entire information
of a blockchain.
Our protocol allows any client to submit a job and receive
the solution. This is very simple from the point of view of a
client, as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Place a job execution request
Input: Job request q
Output: Best found solution s
1: Register q to the blockchain.
2: Wait until a solution s is received.
3: return s
Algorithm 2 Mine
1: Wait until a new block is added.
2: Set activeChain to the added block.
3: while true do
4: {Process for the jobs that will be executed in the next block
time}
5: Create the list of valid unexecuted jobs.
6: Choose the jobs that will be executed in the next block time.
7: Deduct the charge of these jobs from the client.
8: Include these jobs in the block being added.
9: {Process for the jobs that is executed in the current block
time}
10: Verify newly received items(transactions) and put them in the
block being added.
11: {Process for the jobs that were executed two block times
before}
12: Check the blockchain to see if the solutions found two block
times before were the best solutions, as explained in III-B.
Register the solutions to the blockchain if they were the best.
13: {Process for the jobs that were executed three block times
before}
14: Check if the registered solutions are genuine. Process payment
of the corresponding charge.
15: repeat
16: Execute one of unfinished jobs listed in the previous block,
until a new mini-block is received.
17: Register the hash value of found solution to the
blockchain(see III-B). This hash value will be included in
the next block.
18: Verify the chain associated with the received mini-block by
calling Algorithm 3.
19: if the mini-block is valid and the corresponding chain is
longer then
20: Change activeChain to the chain with the mini-block.
21: Move the items in orphaned blocks to the list of newly
received items.
22: end if
23: until a new block is added
24: end while
In order for a job to be executed and the resulting payment
to be made, it takes at least 4 block times. The following is
how a job is processed in the fastest scenario.
Block time 0 A job is broadcast by the client.
Block time 1 Validity of the job is inspected. The charge
is deducted from the client’s account. This job is chosen for
execution in block time 2.
Block time 2 The job is executed.
Block time 3 Each node broadcasts the hash value of found
solution. These hash values are registered on the blockchain.
Block time 4 The charge is paid to the node that found the
best solution.
Job execution and payments are all processed by miners.
Miners process jobs in a pipelined manner. Algorithm 2 shows
how they are processed from the miner’s point of view.
There are two threads running in parallel, and Algorithm 2
runs on one of them. In the other thread, the received items
are enqueued in the list of newly received items. In order to
Algorithm 3 Verify
Input: Mini-block b
Output: Verify the chain corresponding to b and returns true iff it
succeeds.
1: for all blocks k in the chain pointed by b in chronological order
do
2: if the same block as k is included in a previously verified
chain then
3: continue
4: end if
5: Check all the transactions in k, return false if it fails.
6: if k is old then
7: Do relaxed verification explained in III-E and return false
if it fails.
8: else
9: for all mini-blocks m between k and the next block do
10: if the same mini-block as m is included in a previously
verified chain then
11: continue
12: end if
13: Execute the evaluator and check if the nonce and all
the hash values satisfy the corresponding requirements,
return false if it fails.
14: end for
15: end if
16: end for
17: return true
Algorithm 4 Random search
Input: Hash h of the block to be added, node ID id, evaluator ev
Output: The best solution candidate found in the search
1: bests := null, beste = null
2: repeat
3: Generate a random solution candidate s.
4: e := ev(s, hash(h, id))
5: if e is better than beste then
6: beste := e, bests := s
7: end if
8: h := hash(h, id, s, e)
9: if h begins with the required number of zero bits then
10: broadcast the mini-block.
11: break
12: end if
13: until a new mini-block is received
14: return [bests, beste]
register an item on the blockchain, it has to be broadcast to
the network. When these items are received by a miner, they
are enqueued in the list.
After Algorithm 2 starts, the miner first choose the chain to
work on(line 1-2). There can be multiple valid chains, and they
all begin with the same block. One specific sequence of block,
or a chain, can be specified by the last block. The miner starts
working on the chain associated with the first block received.
At line 5, the balance of the client’s account is checked.
At line 8, in order to make all the miners work on the same
set of jobs, a consensus has to be made on the set of jobs and
the corresponding numbers of zero bits before the miners start
working on them.
At line 16, a searcher is executed in the execution envi-
ronment explained in III-D. As an example of a searcher, a
random search algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4. As ex-
plained in III-A, this searcher internally calls the correspond-
ing evaluator. Each time an evaluator is called, it automatically
creates the nonce with the result of evaluation, and checks
the hash value if it begins with the required number of zero
bits. If it does, the new mini-block is broadcast, and the
execution of searcher is terminated. The execution of searcher
also terminates if a new mini-block is added by another mining
node. Please note that when a new block is added, the last
mini-block for that block is also added.
At line 18, the chain associated with a mini-block is verified.
This procedure is shown in Algorithm 3. This algorithm works
as explained in III-C and III-E. There is no need to verify
blocks and mini-blocks if exactly the same blocks or mini-
blocks are included in a chain previously verified by that node.
At line 21, the items contained in orphaned blocks are
moved to the list of newly received items. An orphaned block
is a block that was a part of the chain worked on by the miner,
but no more because the miner is working on another chain
now.
IV. CONSIDERATION
A. Requirements for evaluator
The whole scheme of PoS depends on the way it enforces
an evaluation each time a hash value is generated.
We now consider an attack where one of the items in Fig. 2
is altered by a miner. Altering an item in a block is not always
easy, but here we assume a pessimistic scenario in which
the miner can alter an item freely. Suppose that an evaluator
returns the same value at a rate of once per u times if the same
first argument and a different second argument are given. The
miner could try calculating the hash value of a block faster
than it should be in the following way.
1) The miner alters the item.
2) Calculate the hash value of the block assuming that the
evaluator returns the same value.
3) Check if the hash value begins with the required number
of zero bits.
4) If it does, then execute the evaluator to check if it returns
the assumed value.
The above attempt succeeds at a rate of once per u times. The
rate of generating the valid hash value of a block is higher
with this method if evaluation is very slow and u is small. In
order to prevent it from paying off, the following condition
has to be satisfied.
u >
Amount of computation in evaluation and hash calculation
Amount of computation in hash calculation
B. Probability of fork
A fork in blockchain is a situation where there are two or
more valid chains with the same length. In Bitcoin, a fork
happens when a mining node adds a block before knowing
that another node has already added a block. This can happen
because of message delivery delay in a network.
Now we discuss how the probability of fork is affected
by introducing mini-blocks. For the sake of simplicity, we
suppose that there are only two mining nodes in the network.
A communication channel with a constant delay d connects
them. We can model block creation as a Poisson process. Now,
suppose that node A has created a block right now. Then, the
probability p1 of a fork within time d is the probability that
the other node B creates another block within this time period,
while A does not create a block in this period.
p1 = e
−λd(e−λdλd),
where λ is the average number of block creation per interval
· node.
We now assume that all mini-blocks require the same
expected amount of computation to be added. The probability
pN of a fork with length N after a creation of some block is
the probability of this event to happen N times in succession.
pN =
{
e−λd(e−λdλd)
}N
(1)
In the proposed method, N mini-blocks are required to be
added before adding a new block. Therefore, the above event
has to succeed N times in order for a fork to happen.
We now assume that all mini-blocks have the same creation
rate λ = N , where N is the number of mini-blocks required
to add a block. Equation 1 is plotted in Fig. 4. It is shown
that the probability of a fork can be significantly lowered by
increasing the number of mini-blocks.
C. Variance of block time
Now we discuss how the variance of a block time is affected
by introducing mini-blocks. The probability b(t) of a block to
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be added within time period t is the probability of N or more
mini-blocks are added within this period. We have N mini-
block creation per interval in average, and then,
b(t) = 1− e−Nt
N−1∑
i=0
(Nt)i
i!
. (2)
Fig. 5 shows the probability of a block to be added within
a time period. The expected block time is 1, and the variance
is 1/N . This means that the variance of block time decreases
as the number of mini-blocks increases.
D. Winning probability of a node
In Bitcoin, the winning probability for each miner is pro-
portional to its computation power. This is because when a
block is added, the probability for each node to be the node
that added the block is proportional to the number of hash
values generated by that node.
Now we discuss the winning probability of each node to add
each mini-block. Suppose that there is no message delivery
delay, and all nodes share the latest information. When a
new block is added, the total computation for adding all the
corresponding mini-blocks is the same as the total computation
power spent by miners in that block time. The probability wn,k
for node n to add mini-block k is as follows.
wn,k =
Computation power spent by n for k
Total computation power spent for k
E. Properties of PoS
The following is the list of properties that PoS has.
• All the properties of PoW listed in II-A are preserved.
• Any node can submit a job and become a client.
• A client can specify any instance of an optimization
problem in a job.
• A client can implement any search algorithm for any
optimization problem for a job.
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• A client pays a charge for its job.
• Miners have a financial incentive to find a good solution
for the instance in a job.
• Miners have a financial incentive to provide the best
found solution to the client.
• The charge is automatically paid to the node who pro-
vides the best solution to the client.
• A probabilistic proof that the miners have evaluated a
large number of solution candidates is provided.
• Multiple jobs can be executed at a time.
• The winning probability for each miner to find the best
solution is proportional to the computation power spent
by the miner for the job.
• The expected amount of computation for a job is propor-
tional to the charge paid for the job.
• The variance of block time is lower than that with PoW.
• The probability of a fork is lower than that with PoW.
• The storage capacity required to manage a blockchain
based on PoS is not too large.
• A blockchain based on PoS accepts jobs that run on
computers with different architectures.
PoS has built-in countermeasures against the following
cases.
• A node submits a problem instance which the node
already knows a good solution.
• A node has very effective way of searching for a solution
of some specific problems.
• A node tries to steal a solution found by another node.
The requirements for an evaluator are as follows.
• It takes a solution candidate for the first argument, and a
hash value for the second argument.
• It returns the evaluation of the solution candidate with a
tiny amount of error depending on both the arguments.
• It has to satisfy the condition explained in IV-A.
F. Security consideration
Irrespective of search strategies, there is no difference in
difficulty of generating a valid nonce. Thus, the following
items are allowed for nodes.
• Using its own search method, instead of the provided
searcher.
• Sharing intermediate results of a search among other
nodes.
• Participating in a search for only a particular job, instead
of trying to add a whole block.
• Starting the search right after a job is submitted.
There is always possibility for an evaluator to be reverse-
engineered. If some malicious party comes to know how error
is introduced in some specific evaluator, they would try to
quickly compute the output of evaluator with a different sec-
ond argument by reusing the result of previous evaluation. This
is a potential flaw of PoS, but can be prevented by introducing
error in an early stage of evaluation, rather than the last step.
For example, an evaluator for TSP could be implemented to
introduce error by slightly changing the positions of cities.
When a mini-block is added, the corresponding nonce with
a hash value beginning with a required number of zero bits is
broadcast to the network. A solution candidate is included in
this nonce, and we can think of a cheat where a miner tries
to find a better solution by taking advantage of this solution
candidate. There is about one block time to carry out a search
after a nonce is received, before the deadline of registering a
hash value of the found solution. However, such an attempt
would be hardly advantageous because this solution candidate
is found in the middle of a search, and therefore it is unlikely
to be the best solution found by the node that added the mini-
block. It is also not very likely that the node that adds the
block also finds the best solution among all nodes.
We can think of another cheat where a malicious client
implements an evaluator in such a way that it returns unfairly
high evaluation when a special solution candidate is given.
The client would implement the searcher in such a way that it
does not evaluate such a solution candidate. By submitting a
job with such an evaluator, the client can almost always find
the best solution, and collect the charge. However, this client
cannot obtain the solutions found by other nodes, because a
node publishes its solution only if it is the winning node. The
client is still be able to obtain the solution candidate contained
in the nonce. However, this would not be a very good solution
candidate, as explained above. Such a cheat can be financially
discouraged by giving a part of charge to the node that added
the new block.
There are several ways of making a denial-of-service(DoS)
attack that prevents execution or payment for jobs, although
most of them are not very effective. We can think of a DoS
attack where a malicious node registers a false good evaluation
with a false hash value on the blockchain when the best found
solution is chosen and provided to the client. This prevents the
client from receiving the true solution. If there is a node that
makes such an attack, that node has to be banned from the
network and the payment process has to be started over.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a consensus protocol for blockchains
with which the wasted energy in the Proof-of-work system
can be used for solving optimization problems submitted by
any users. We showed that the probability of a fork and the
variance of block time can be lowered with the proposed
protocol.
A blockchain with our protocol can be viewed as a grid
computing infrastructure. The computation service provided
by such a blockchain would be beneficial for computation
tasks whose intermediate results can be published. We expect
that there is a large public demand for such a computation
service, considering popularity of the BOINC projects and
public clouds.
The computation in our protocol is ASIC resistant. This
will make mining with ordinary CPUs more profittable. Unlike
cloud computing, computers used in mining need not be reli-
able. Since the computation resources are not wasted anymore,
public organizations and more general users are expected to
join. This would make the blockchain with our protocol more
decentralized than existing ones.
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